{"id":4437,"date":"2023-09-04T11:22:02","date_gmt":"2023-09-04T11:22:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sdsa-geneve.ch\/?p=4437"},"modified":"2023-09-26T19:32:49","modified_gmt":"2023-09-26T19:32:49","slug":"why-democratization-is-so-hard-in-the-levant-and-what-role-diplomacy-has-played-part-3-iraqs-post-invasion-democracy-the-creation-of-a-new-monster","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/en\/2023\/09\/04\/why-democratization-is-so-hard-in-the-levant-and-what-role-diplomacy-has-played-part-3-iraqs-post-invasion-democracy-the-creation-of-a-new-monster\/","title":{"rendered":"Why democratization is so hard in the Levant \u2013 and what role diplomacy has played ? Part 3: Iraq\u2019s post-invasion \u201cdemocracy\u201d \u2013 the creation of a new monster"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">In this series, we try to analyze why states in the Levant are still far from being democratic \u2013 and what responsibility foreign diplomats \u2013 especially Western diplomats \u2013 bear. <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">In the first part of this series, we saw how, at the beginning of the 20th century, European leaders divvied up what was previously the Ottoman Empire. In the process, they drew arbitrary borders that cut across ethnic, sectarian and religious lines, rendering a demographic make-up of these territories that isn\u2019t exactly conducive to a united national identity. In the second part, we saw how Western governments and their diplomats both have created and supported autocratic regimes in the Levant \u2013 to the detriment of the people\u2019s struggle for self-determination, using the example of Jordan.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">In this third part, we\u2019ll explore what happens when the international community \u2013 specifically the US government and partially the United Nations Security Council \u2013 do the opposite and topple autocratic regimes in the Levant, using the example of Iraq.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">Toppling Saddam&rsquo;s regime<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">In March 2003, a United States-led coalition invaded Iraq, with the aim \u201cto disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein\u2019s support of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.\u201d [1] A month after the first troops hit Iraqi ground, Bush declared the successful topple of Saddam\u2019s regime. The latter, and the Arab Socialist Ba\u2019ath Party he headed, had come into power following a military coup in 1968. Under his (majority Sunni) leadership, the Iraqi government committed vast numbers of crimes against Iraq\u2019s primarily Kurdish and Shi\u2019a populations.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Though it is undisputed that this invasion was illegal under the UN Charter, the U.N. Security Council later tasked occupying forces with \u201c[the promotion of] the welfare of the Iraqi people, [\u2026] the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.\u201d The so-called \u201cCoalition Provisional Authority\u201d (CPA), created and funded as a division of the U.S. Department of Defense, vested itself with broad executive, legislative and judicial authority, effectively acting as Iraqi government for the period from April 2003 to June 2004.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">The plan for a new state<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">The question of how to rule post-Saddam Hussein Iraq had been settled long prior to the invasion. In fact, the regime\u2019s opponents that had been exiled from the country \u2013 majority Shi\u2019a, as part of the oppressed group \u2013 had been planning for a new state for decades. They believed that justice would be served by a new state order that reflected the \u201cactual\u201d religious and ethnic make-up of Iraqi society: \u201cShi&rsquo;a Arabs representing 55% of the population, Sunni Arabs 33%, and Kurds 19%\u201d.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Thus, during the so-called \u201ctransitional period\u201d \u2013 meaning moving from US rule to fully Iraqi rule \u2013 the advisory councils and provisional governments were all chosen based on these sectarian quotas. Strategically speaking, for the newly returned political elite \u2013 devoid of any real indigenous support base, political platform, or power \u2013 sectarianism offered an attractive means of legitimization for the marginalized and oppressed of the Saddam regime.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Most importantly, this meant that the first political parties to participate in the new Iraqi democracy fused along ethnic and sectarian lines to define their constituencies: United Iraqi Alliance for the Shia population and Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan for the Kurdish population. For the Sunni population, however, representation was made a lot more complicated by the CPA\u2019s so-called \u201cde-Baathification\u201d policy: the purging of the administration of tens of thousands of civil servants, ranging from political elites to primary-school teachers \u2013 all based on Ba\u2019ath Party affiliation (meaning all those that worked in the public sector under Saddam\u2019s regime) rather than on actual conduct.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">Sectarism and the <em>muhasasa<\/em><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">In the first decade after the invasion, instead of engaging in issue-based rhetoric, the new ruling elites fired up decades-old divisions between Shi\u2019a, Sunni and Kurdish groups, fueling the Iraqi civil war of 2006-2007 and firing up more hatred during the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Even when secular political factions attempted to enter the political arena, with a message of equal citizenship for all and a replacement of the sectarian politics that had driven the country into civil war, the ruling elite used de-Ba\u2019athification legislation to discredit and ban a large number of its (Sunni) candidates from participating in elections.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Crucially, sectarian parties were able to cement their newly acquired dominance over the state through the so-called \u201cmuhasasa\u201d (translated as \u201cquotas\u201d). Muhasasa has two components. First, it refers to the repartition of certain positions to particular sects, with a Kurdish President, a Shi\u2019a PM and a Sunni Speaker of Parliament. Second, it refers to the divvying up of state institutions among the parties within the larger ethno-sectarian blocs. After every election, there are ferocious battles for control of ministries, where the largest prizes, such as the Ministries of Oil, Transport, and Electricity, usually go to the most powerful parties. Some parties have even \u201ccolonized\u201d particular ministries in Baghdad and are seen as \u201cowning\u201d the institution.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Even worse, over time, all major parties have affiliated with militias to protect their interests. These militias originally filled the void created by the CPA\u2019s disbanding of the Iraqi army and police, forming a de facto security sector. Now that they\u2019ve affiliated with a party, they are used to intimidating journalists, protesters, and other political opponents.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">The \u00ab\u00a0partytocracy\u00a0\u00bb &#8211; why Iraq isn&rsquo;t even close to being democratic<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Over time, as sectarian divisions ingrained themselves in the system and gained wider acceptance in the political landscape, dynamics have shifted: Unconcerned with genuine political constituencies, party apportionment is now overtly about the division of spoils among unrepresentative political actors. In fact, recent research on party organizations shows a trend toward oligarchic leaders who collude \u2013 rather than compete \u2013 with other parties, dubbed a \u201cpartyocracy\u201d. In the face of public pressure, the previously divided political elite has united against the common threat to the status quo: the people.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">The various grievances of the Iraqi people towards their government have been brought to light repeatedly through popular protests starting in 2011, continuing in 2015, and culminating in the greatest protests to date in 2018 and 2019.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Most of the protesters were under 30 years old and had grown up in a country ravaged by sectarian wars, lacking infrastructure and public goods, and where state institutions are structured by corruption and nepotism. Hence, these youth rejected Islamism and identity-based political formation entirely. In response, the threatened partyocracy made every effort to thwart and discredit the protests. Reports also suggest that the parties deployed their militias to intimidate, beat, and humiliate protesters.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">Conclusion<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">From the very beginning, the Iraqi people did not trust the new political elite. Firstly, they were tainted by their association with the U.S. invasion and its dubious justifications. Secondly, since many had long lived outside of Iraq, they were seen to be out of touch with the country\u2019s current reality. And thirdly, though the CPA saw them as potential intermediaries between the international administrators and the Iraqi staff, the new elite\u2019s lack of administrative experience made them extremely poor managers.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">To summarize, in Iraq, democracy was forcefully imposed by foreign powers. Though their involvement did bring about many necessary constitutional changes for Iraq, Iraq is nowhere near what the international community had anticipated Iraq would look like once they would \u201cbring democracy.\u201d Instead of \u201creturning\u201d the government to the people, old corrupt leaders have been replaced with equally corrupt leaders. In addition, regional instability has provided the momentum for foreign-backed paramilitary groups to infiltrate \u2013 and even dominate \u2013 today\u2019s political landscape.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">US (and to a lesser degree, UN Security Council) diplomats not only did not free the Iraqi people by toppling Saddam\u2019s autocratic regime but created a whole new monster of an institutionalized oppressive multi-party regime that has turned on its people. This whole process not only cost the Iraqi people 20 years of instability, war, corruption and poverty but might possibly have even prolonged the road to peace and self-determination by a long shot.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\"><b><span lang=\"FR\" style=\"font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;\">Sources :<br \/>\n[1] \u201cPresident Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom\u201d, President\u2019s Radio Address, transcript released on March 22, 2003.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Human Rights Watch, \u201cJustice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper\u201d, (December 2002).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">\u201cPresident Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom\u201d, President\u2019s Radio Address, transcript released on March 22, 2003.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">\u201cExcerpts: Annan Interview\u201d, BBC News (16 September 2004).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">\u201cMission Accomplished Speech\u201d, a televised address on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res. 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc S\/RES\/1483.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Marten Zwanenburg, \u201cExistentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of occupation\u201d, International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 86, no. 856 (December 2004): 765-766.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res. 1511 (16 October 2003) UN Doc S\/RES\/1511.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Toby Dodge and Renad Mansour, \u201cSectarianization and de-Sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq&rsquo;s Political Field\u201d, The Review of Faith and International Affairs Vol. 18, no. 1 (2020): 61.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Zahra Ali, \u00ab\u00a0From Recognition to Redistribution? Protest Movements in Iraq in the Age of &lsquo;New Civil Society'\u00a0\u00bb, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (26 March 2021): 3.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Charles Clover, \u00ab\u00a0Iraq to Get Interim Council Later this Month\u00a0\u00bb, Financial Times (8 July 2003).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, \u00ab\u00a0Iraq&rsquo;s Year of Rage\u00a0\u00bb, Journal of Democracy Vol. 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 113-116.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Charles Clover, \u201cShia Look to Dominate Iraqi Parliament\u201d, The Financial Times (3 November 2004).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012): 215.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Haddad Fanar, \u00ab\u00a0From Existential Struggle to Political Banality: The Politics of Sect in Post-2003 Iraq\u00a0\u00bb, The Review of Faith &amp; International Affairs Vol. 18, no. 1 (2020): 75.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Khalid Al-Ansary, \u201cThousands rally in Iraq\u2019s \u201cDay of Rage\u201d protests\u201d, Reuters (25 February 2011).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Zahra Ali, \u00ab\u00a0From Recognition to Redistribution? Protest Movements in Iraq in the Age of &lsquo;New Civil Society'\u00a0\u00bb, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (26 March 2021): 4.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Sarwar Mohammed Abdullah, \u201cCorruption protection: fractionalization and the corruption of anti-corruption efforts in Iraq after 2003\u201d, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 46, no. 3 (2019): 359.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, \u00ab\u00a0Changing Modes of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,\u00a0\u00bb Party Politics Vol. 1 (January 1995): 5-28.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Miranda Sissons and Abdulraqqaz Al-Saiedi, \u00ab\u00a0A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq\u00a0\u00bb International Center for Transitional Justice (March 2013).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Beth K. Dougherty, \u00ab\u00a0De-Baathification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice\u00a0\u00bb, Middle East Institute (30 January 2014).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Renad Mansour, \u00ab\u00a0More Than Militas: Iraq&rsquo;s Popular Mobilization Forces Are Here to Stay\u00a0\u00bb, War on the Rocks (3 April 2018).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Haddad Fanar \u00ab\u00a0The Waning Relevance of the Sunni-Shia Divide\u00a0\u00bb, The Century Foundation (10 April 2019).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Erin Cunningham and Mustafa Salim, \u201cIraq\u2019s Shiites helped boost the political elite in Baghdad. Now they want to bring it down.\u201d, The Washington Post (29 December 2019).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">Simona Foltyn, \u00ab\u00a0They are worse than Saddam&rsquo;: Iraqis Take to Streets to Topple Regime\u00a0\u00bb, The Observer (27 October 2019).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">UNAMI, \u00ab\u00a0Demonstrations in Iraq, 1-9 October 2019\u00a0\u00bb Human Rights Special Report (22 October 2019).<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"margin: 0cm 0cm 8pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Liberation Serif'; text-align: justify; line-height: 20.8px;\">UNAMI, \u00ab\u00a0Demonstrations in Iraq Update&rsquo;, 25 October &#8211; 4 November 2019\u00a0\u00bb Human Rights Special Report (5 November 2019).<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In this series, we try to analyze why states in the Levant are still far from being democratic \u2013 and what responsibility foreign diplomats \u2013 especially Western diplomats \u2013 bear. In the first part of this series, we saw how, at the beginning of the 20th century, European leaders divvied up what was previously the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":36,"featured_media":4596,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0},"categories":[84,92],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4437"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/36"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4437"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4437\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4438,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4437\/revisions\/4438"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4596"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4437"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4437"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/old.sdsa-geneve.ch\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4437"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}